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Propaganda and the Duality of 
Media: A Look into the Tactics of 
the RTLM in Rwanda
By Brianna Corrie
Brianna Corrie is a sophomore double-majoring in Peace, War, and Defense & Media/Jour-
nalism with a concentration in Advertising and Public Relations. She is passionate about the 
intersection of media and government, especially as it relates to propaganda and misinforma-
tion campaigns. This piece was inspired by a class discussion and seeks to answer the popular 
question, "how could we allow this to happen?" 
aligned itself heavily with the Na-
tional Republican Movement for 
Democracy and Development party 
(MRND). The newspaper was estab-
lished following the 1990 Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion from 
Uganda. From the very beginning 
of its publications, Kangura featured 
strong anti-Tutsi propaganda. The 
paper had a variety of tactics to in-
cite hate towards the Tutsis, includ-
ing sexually graphic depictions of 
Tutsi women, as well as other offen-
sive cartoons to cater to the illiterate 
population of Rwanda.1 In Decem-
ber of 1990, Kangura published a 
“Ten Commandments of Bahutu,” 
which encouraged Hutus to break 
all ties they had with Tutsis, wheth-
er that be professional, business, 
or marital relationships.2 The “Ten 
Commandments” were not as well 
received by the Hutu population, so 
the paper switched to other tactics 
to incite stronger anti-Tutsi senti-
ment. One of those tactics included 
an emphasis on the living conditions 
in 1957 rather than the 1990s; Kan-
gura continually attempted to dig 
up repressed feelings that inspired 
revolutionary action.3 Moreover, 
the paper played up the fact that the 
Tutsi were the favored group by the 
previously ruling Belgians and re-
named the Tutsis as colonizers.
Print Media Environment
     It is important to note that while 
Kangura is the most well-known 
newspaper, the overall print media 
industry only appealed to a small 
section of the population based on 
literacy rates and the wealth of the 
readers. In an April 1991 census, only 
57% of the population could read or 
write.4 Additionally, the print media 
industry relied heavily on external 
financial support. “When the private 
press was first established, a news-
paper sold for 50 Rwandan francs 
(about US $0.30). After devaluation 
of the Rwandan franc by 67 percent 
Ethnic polarization was long established in Rwanda, stem-ming from the colonial lega-
cies set forth by the ruling Belgium 
colonizers, who favored the minori-
ty Tutsis over the majority Hutus. 
The various media outlets in Rwan-
da at the time did not introduce new 
ideas, but rather inflated the pre-ex-
isting tensions between groups to 
catalyze violent action. This paper 
explores the specific tactics em-
ployed by the Radio Télévision Libre 
des Mille Collines (RTLM) to pro-
mote genocide between the years 
1993 and 1994. 
Contextual Background: 
Kangura Print Media
     When considering the role of 
media in the Rwandan Genocide, 
most people think of RTLM; how-
ever, RTLM drew a lot of inspiration 
from print media preceding 1994. 
Specifically, RTLM drew influence 
from Kangura, a newspaper that 
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in November 1990, under an In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) 
structural adjustment program, the 
cost of a copy doubled.”5 This means 
that newspapers that aligned them-
selves with affluent political parties, 
such as the MRND, were the most 
successful. Upon obtaining finan-
cial viability, newspapers also had to 
find markets and create distribution 
systems. Only government newspa-
pers were able to reach individuals 
living in rural areas, meaning that 
most of the population did not even 
know newspapers with different 
opinions existed. This is also be-
cause the Ministry of Information 
created barriers to the creation of 
such newspapers. In 1992, the gov-
ernment passed a law recognizing 
freedom of the press, but it required 
journalists to get authorization from 
the Ministry of Information and 
jump through a number of hoops 
before getting approval to publish.6 
So, while recognizing the freedom 
of the press, the government and 
the ruling party (MRND) could still 
limit the amount of information ac-
cessible to the Rwandan public.
Introduction to Radio
     For the aforementioned reasons, 
much of the Rwandan population 
utilized radio broadcasts as their 
means to get information. Prior to 
1991, Radio Rwanda was the only 
radio station and acted as the of-
ficial voice of the government. It 
broadcasted appointments and dis-
missals of government posts, re-
minders from the president, as well 
as candidates admitted to second-
ary schools.7 Radio Rwanda even 
broadcasted false information about 
the progress of war, but most people 
did not have access to independent 
sources to verify these claims.8 In 
March of 1992, Radio Rwanda was 
used to promote the killing of Tut-
sis in Bugesera by falsely reporting 
Tutsi mobilization to attack Hutus. 
At this point, the government rec-
ognized the freedom of the press as 
voices of dissent for Habyarimana’s 
government grew louder and loud-
er.
RTLM’s Tactics in Promot-
ing Genocide: Introduction
     As the voices of dissent from the 
Tutsi minority grew louder, so did 
the government’s pushback. The 
RTLM was launched as a semi-pri-
vate radio station in July 1993, fol-
lowing the signing of the Arusha 
Accords. The Arusha Accords also 
drew in United Nations peacekeep-
ing forces to help parties implement 
the agreement. While polarization 
was always present in Rwanda, 
events in nearby Burundi furthered 
this divide. The Hutu Burundi pres-
ident was assassinated on October 
21, 1993, leading the Hutus of Bu-
rundi to attack Tutsis.9 Converse-
ly, Tutsis started executing reprisal 
killings of the Hutus. Overall, these 
incidents caused people to question 
the integrity and effectiveness of the 
Arusha Accords.10 The RTLM sen-
sationalized reports of these events 
in order to increase the population’s 
fear of the Tutsi. From October on, 
the RTLM repeatedly and forcefully 
promoted extremist ideas to further 
divide Hutus and Tutsis. In April 
1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot 
down,  which advanced extremist 
ideas in the media. Moving forward, 
the RTLM continued to air hate 
speech and escalated to instructing 
the killings of Tutsis in Rwanda.11
     When learning about the RTLM’s 
role in the Rwandan Genocide, it 
is easy to adopt the stereotype that 
Rwandans are blind followers, poor-
ly educated, and easily manipulated. 
This stereotype is dangerous, as it di-
minishes the media and the RTLM’s 
role in promoting these violent, eth-
nic killings. The show was formulat-
ed and designed to deliver MRND 
propaganda, and it employed a va-
riety of tactics to mobilize the Hutu 
majority to violent action. Some of 
the tactics employed included the 
use of an interactive format, the ex-
trapolation of previous knowledge, 
the incorporation of elements of 
truth, the exacerbation of existing 
tensions, the strategic use of lan-
guage choice, and, finally, the ma-
nipulation of fear as a tool for mo-
bilization. 
Interactive Format to Reach 
New Audiences
     One of the main benefits of utiliz-
ing radio for mass communication 
was that it could reach a larger au-
dience of people. Because freedom 
of the press was granted in 1992, 
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Knowledge to Increase 
Trust and Legitimacy
     One of the biggest questions sur-
rounding RTLM is how a station 
that incites so much violence and 
hate could gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of its listeners. To unpack this 
question, we must analyze it from 
two different levels. First, the station 
built on Hutus’ previous knowledge 
and inclinations to gain trust from 
listeners. The incorporation of ev-
eryday people onto the station cre-
ated a psychological loyalty from 
the start, whether listeners realized 
it or not. According to Maslow’s Hi-
erarchy of Needs, loyalty is directly 
tied to your customers’ (or in this 
case, listeners’) feeling of belong-
ing.15 Given the colonial legacy of 
a Tutsi elite, the RTLM was a place 
where grievances could be aired and 
appreciated by others with similar 
experiences. It provided the Hutu 
majority with this very feeling of be-
longing, which then culminated in 
a steadfast loyalty and obedience to 
the radio station. Moreover, RTLM 
entwined its propaganda with les-
sons taught in schools to build cred-
ibility amongst the Hutu listeners. 
For example, the station empha-
sized the idea that Hutus and Tutsis 
were different peoples by nature, of-
ten equating these differences to the 
fundamental differences between 
males and females.16 The technique 
of assessing a “biologically supe-
rior” ethnic group is nothing new, 
as it was also used to justify slavery 
in America. Also, propaganda ex-
ploiting the tensions between Hutus 
and Tutsis was not unprecedented. 
In fact, a lot of the information the 
station broadcasted was inspired by 
the Kangura newspaper.17 The only 
difference was that RTLM used its 
platform and lively, casual format to 
present this perspective in a more 
digestible way. 
     Lastly, the interactive broadcasting 
format was not a short-lived, intro-
ductory tactic, but a technique used 
throughout the genocide. Journal-
ists from RTLM often interviewed 
people at the roadside checkpoints 
of Kigali and gave them an opportu-
nity to explain on air what they were 
doing and why.18 This further legit-
imized the violence the show en-
dorsed, as ordinary people received 
real-time confirmation of others 
committing these acts. 
Utilizing “Experts” and Ele-
ments of Truth to Increase 
Credibility
     While the RTLM exploited the 
predispositions of its listeners to gain 
trust, it also employed techniques to 
gain credibility among those who 
might be on the fence with their 
message. The station regularly cited 
intellectuals or university professors 
as the source of their information. 
While this may be true, the sourc-
es were often from Habyarimana’s 
home region and some of his most 
devout supporters.19 Furthermore, 
the advancement and continued 
employment of some of these “ex-
perts” was reliant on their support 
more and more voices came on air 
and drowned out the messages of 
Radio Rwanda. In turn, supporters 
of the MRND and a related party 
launched the RTLM in July 1993 to 
combat the disadvantage in num-
bers. The RTLM was specifically 
designed to echo the message of of-
ficial authorities but deliver the ma-
terial in a more informal manner. In 
fact, while many Hutu and MRND 
elites backed the RTLM, the price of 
the share was kept relatively low to 
attract the average, middle class cit-
izens.12 Aside from being econom-
ically appealing, the show’s format 
took on a conversational and casual 
approach. In the beginning, RTLM 
was very similar to any other ra-
dio station you might hear today—
they played modern music, had 
quick-witted announcers, and even 
allowed for listeners to call in to 
request songs or exchange gossip.13 
RTLM made an effort to incorporate 
everyday citizens on to the show to 
build a reputation of being “for the 
people.” Even the announcers and 
staff of the station gained popular-
ity; announcer Kantano Habimana 
was known for his quick-wit while 
announcer Valerie Bemeriki was 
known for her speed and passion 
of delivery.14 Overall, the format of 
the show was designed to appeal to 
a new, younger audience—specifi-
cally those who were poor and felt 
deprived of the privileges that the 
Tutsi minority enjoyed.
Building on Previous 
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of the government, thus giving them 
another incentive, aside from home-
town loyalties, to falsify or exagger-
ate information for the RTLM.20 
     The RTLM also incorporated ele-
ments of truth into its broadcasts in 
order to gain credibility. The station 
took a position against UN pres-
ence in the region, Tutsis, RPF, and 
RPF supporters. The UN showed up 
in the region in 1993, and in sev-
eral cases, behaved badly towards 
Habyarimana supporters. These 
instances provided the RTLM with 
a credible kernel of truth to build 
credibility and further support for 
their cause.21 As time went on and 
the RTLM gained more popularity, 
it started directly promoting action 
in the genocide. For most, follow-
ing orders from a semi-private ra-
dio station seems absurd. However, 
many local authorities of Rwandan 
villages and towns instructed their 
constituents to treat the radio as di-
rect orders from themselves.22 The 
backing from local authorities thus 
substantiated RTLM’s credibility 
even more in the eyes of the Hutu 
population.
Exacerbating Existing Ten-
sions through the Use of Ex-
aggerations
     Another technique of the RTLM 
was to exacerbate the existing ten-
sions of ethnic groups by exaggerat-
ing or embellishing events. The fact 
that the Hutu-Tutsi tensions went 
beyond Rwandan borders helped 
muster support for MRND propa-
ganda. For example, when the Hutu 
President of Burundi was assassinat-
ed by a bayonet blow to the chest, the 
RTLM reported the incident with 
extreme exaggerations. It reported 
details of torture and castration of 
the president, which stemmed from 
the ethnic practices of pre-colonial 
Tutsi kings when they defeated ene-
my rules.23 Not only was this infor-
mation false, it also reminded listen-
ers of the old practices of Tutsis and 
evoked the same feelings of revolu-
tionary action.
Strategic Use of Language 
to Dehumanize and Facili-
tate Genocide
     From its conception, the RTLM 
was very strategic in its use of lan-
guage. There was a large effort to blur 
the lines between Tutsis and the RPF. 
Inyenzi, meaning cockroach, was 
often used when referring to RPF 
combatants and its supporters to de-
humanize them.24 Furthermore, the 
station would use terms like “Tutsi” 
and inyenzi interchangeably when 
referring to RPF combatants, so that 
listeners automatically associated all 
Tutsis with the RPF, and therefore 
saw them as enemies. The RTLM 
even broadcasted that RPF combat-
ants were dressing in civilian clothes 
and disguising themselves.25 The de-
scription of the RPF disguises, how-
ever, was simply a description of a 
Tutsi. While it may seem minute, 
the interchangeable use of RPF and 
Tutsi terms helped condition, facil-
itate, and legitimize violence later 
on. Additionally, RTLM frequently 
used euphemisms to convince lis-
teners that violent action taken to-
wards the Tutsis was for the “com-
mon good.” The station called for 
individuals “ready to work,” and the 
elimination of those not willing to 
“work.”26 The use of the word “work” 
as a euphemism for “kill” not only 
disguises the act from what it is but 
presents killing the Tutsis as a civic 
duty of the Hutus.
The Manipulation of Fear as 
a Tool for Mobilization
     The previously mentioned tac-
tics were used simultaneously, but 
they all paved the way for the RTLM 
to exercise its true power and in-
fluence in the genocide. Perhaps 
the most powerful tactic, however, 
was its ability to manipulate fear in 
order to mobilize action. “For in-
stance, a May 20, 1994, broadcast 
described Tutsis as gathering guns, 
killing Hutu families and burning 
down their houses, then hiding in 
a church preparing for another at-
tack.”27 The overwhelming fear ex-
perienced by Hutus provoked the 
burning of this church. The station 
also instructed the killings of specif-
ic targets. One broadcast instructed 
residents to eliminate Antoine Se-
bera, a Tutsi business man. Anoth-
er broadcast instructed assailants to 
attack a mosque where Tutsis were 
seeking refuge.28 Every attack in-
structed by the RTLM was framed 
to be an act of retaliation. They of-
ten told listeners that the specified 
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year before the Rwandan Genocide 
changed the will of the Western 
world to even commit itself to the 
betterment of the developing world. 
The october 1993 Black Hawk Down 
incident killed eighteen Americans 
and propelled the U.S. to pull out 
from the region.30 While hundreds 
of thousands of Somalis were dying, 
the price for U.S. involvement be-
came too high. Moreover, the Amer-
ican public was extremely scarred 
by Paul Watson's photo of an Amer-
ican soldier’s corpse being desecrat-
ed by Somali civilians.31 The conflict 
in Rwanda picked up immediately 
after the horrors in Mogadishu, so-
the fear of casualties was heavy on 
the American public’s mind. Only 
two days after Habyarimana's plane 
was shot down, ten Belgian peace-
keepers were tortured and killed. 
The timing of these events only re-
inforced the fear of American death 
and provided more reason for the 
U.S. to remain uninvolved.
     While the media played a great role 
in catalyzing action within Rwan-
da, it failed to do internationally. In 
1994 alone, the U.S. media was con-
sumed by the news of Aldrich Ames’ 
arrest for espionage, O.J. Simpson’s 
arrest for murder, and Tonya Hard-
ing’s kneecapping of a figure skating 
rival. 32 33  In fact, “during the 100 
days of the Rwandan Genocide, 
ABC, CBS, and NBC offered more 
coverage of Tonya Harding than of 
the Rwandan Genocide.”34 Roméo 
Dallaire questions why this was—
asking if it gained attention because 
of a love of pathos or general excite-
ment, or if someone else guided the 
media away from covering Rwan-
da.35 Either way, Rwanda was of no 
interest to the United States nor to 
the international community. Many 
actors viewed the conflict as flare-up 
tribalism, rather than an organized 
and systematic genocide. A repre-
sentative of a major power told Dal-
laire, “You know, this country is of 
no strategic value. Geographically 
it provides us nothing. It’s not even 
worth putting a radar station here. 
Economically it’s nothing, because 
there are no strategic resources.” 36 
Whether the Rwandan Genocide’s 
lack of media international media 
attention was a poor timing issue or 
something more methodical is up 
for interpretation. With the horrors 
experienced by the American public 
following the Somalia conflict, one 
can question whether internation-
al media attention of the Rwandan 
Genocide would have even made 
a difference in U.S. involvement or 
not. 
Conclusion
     The Rwandan Genocide is one 
of the biggest failures of the interna-
tional community, and in turn, one 
of the biggest humanitarian crises 
in history. The RTLM is a prime ex-
ample of expert propaganda. It at-
tracted new audiences, exacerbated 
pre-existing divisions, gained legit-
imacy and credibility, utilized stra-
tegic language and exploited peo-
ple’s fears to direct genocide. It is a 
targets were planning attacks, and 
that the only way to stop these at-
tacks and ensure the safety of the 
Hutus was to eliminate them first. 
Additionally, every attack was also 
celebrated on air and praised as an 
act of heroism. With all the report-
ed Tutsi attacks, the RTLM had even 
prepared explanations as to why no 
bodies were being found. Some of 
these explanations were plausible, 
like the disposal into bodies of wa-
ter. Other explanations claimed that 
the Tutsis carved open Hutus and 
ate their organs.29 The RTLM was 
so good at its propaganda because it 
played on people’s emotions and de-
livered the rationalization of violent 
action on a silver platter. Whenever 
a listener questioned the informa-
tion broadcasted, the RTLM had al-
ready prepared a counter argument 
and evidence to legitimize itself. In 
combination with all the other tac-
tics, the RTLM’s manipulation of 
fear mobilized violent action that 
often went unquestioned by its au-
dience.
International Media
     The RTLM proves that media can 
play a significant role in catalyzing 
action. However, this very idea is 
challenged by the lack of interna-
tional media attention and inter-
vention in the Rwandan Genocide. 
In order to answer this significant 
question, we first must look at the 
international context.
     For starters, the American ex-
perience in Somalia just one short 
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crisis that raises many questions to 
this day: what if international media 
used these same tactics to promote 
intervention? What if the genocide 
occurred at a different time? What 
if Rwanda was of more strategic val-
ue to the major powers? While the 
outcome of the genocide cannot be 
changed, it provides a number of 
lessons to learn from in the future. 
In a time of increasing intercon-
nectedness and globalization, the 
media continually proves to be a 
powerful force that catalyzes action 
– for good or for bad. By monitoring 
the media environment of failing 
states, the international community 
can gain a better understanding of 
the actors’ power, the intensity of 
tensions, and early warning signs 
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(Left) This photo was taken off the Rialto Bridge of the 
Grand Canal as the sun sets over Venice, Italy. 
Photo by Tori Huggins, Emory University Class of 2022 
(Right) Sun-sitting on the beach in front of the hazy 
Indian skies. 
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